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UNSUPPORTABLE AND UNJUSTIFIED:
A CRITIQUE OF ABSOLUTE PROSECUTORIAL
IMMUNITY
Margaret Z. Johns*
INTRODUCTION
Since John G. Roberts, Jr., became Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme
Court on September 29, 2005, 1 the Court has shown a keen interest in civil
rights actions against prosecutors and their immunity from liability.
Specifically, the Court has granted certiorari in one case involving
municipal liability for prosecutorial misconduct,2 and three cases
addressing issues of prosecutorial liability and immunity. 3 But despite this
attention to these issues, it would be premature to ascribe an agenda to the
Roberts Court based on the two decisions it has handed down to date. 4 So
rather than analyzing such a possible agenda, this Article will discuss three
points where the analysis of prosecutorial immunity should be focused: (1)
the significant problem of prosecutorial misconduct and the lack of
* Senior Lecturer, University of California, Davis, School of Law; University of California,
Davis, School of Law, J.D., 1976; University of California, Santa Barbara, B.A., 1970. I am
grateful for the opportunity to participate in the Fordham Law Review’s symposium on
official and municipal liability for constitutional and tort liability, which was inspired and
initiated by Professor Thomas H. Lee and flawlessly organized by Mari Byrne. I am
indebted to John R. Cuti with whom I co-authored an amicus brief in Van de Kamp v.
Goldstein from which much of the historical analysis in Part III is derived. Elizabeth
McKechnie, my library liaison, provided invaluable research support. My friend and
colleague, Carter C. White, contributed numerous valuable suggestions. And, as always, I
relied on my family for support and encouragement—especially Bob and Daisy.
1. Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, U.S. SUPREME COURT,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
2. See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011) (municipal liability for failure to
train based on violations of the duty to disclose exculpatory evidence under Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)).
3. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, (2011) (considering the U.S. Attorney
General’s immunity for using a material witness warrant to detain a suspected terrorist);
Pottawattamie County v. McGhee, 129 S. Ct. 2002, 2002 (2009) (case dismissed after
settlement following oral argument); Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855 (2009); see
also Boundaries of Prosecutorial Immunity to Be Tested in Upcoming Supreme Court Case,
N. CAL. INNOCENCE PROJECT NEWSL. (Santa Clara Law, Santa Clara, Cal.), Summer 2010, at
1 [hereinafter Boundaries of Prosecutorial Immunity], available at http://law.scu.edu/
ncip/file/NCIP_Newsletter_Summer2010_web.pdf (reporting that McGhee was settled for
$12 million for two wrongfully convicted men).
4. See Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1365–66 (2011) (holding that a municipality was not
liable for a single Brady violation); Van de Kamp, 129 S. Ct. at 858–59 (2009) (holding that
a prosecutor was entitled to absolute immunity for failing to adopt an information
management system regarding informants).
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effective deterrent and corrective mechanisms; (2) the absence of any
historical justification for the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity;
and (3) the confusion and conflicts created by the current prosecutorial
immunity doctrine.
First, while the vast majority of prosecutors are dedicated, honest public
servants who serve us all by prosecuting criminals and protecting us from
crime, instances of prosecutorial misconduct are both substantial and
significant. 5 Recent reports have evaluated the frequency of prosecutorial
misconduct, the extent to which prosecutorial misconduct leads to wrongful
convictions, and the ineffectiveness of mechanisms designed to deter,
remedy, or punish prosecutorial misconduct. 6 The conclusions are clear:
prosecutorial misconduct is a significant problem; it leads to a substantial
number of wrongful convictions; and our system lacks effective
mechanisms to deter or remedy prosecutorial misconduct.7
Second, in Supreme Court decisions analyzing the civil rights liability of
prosecutors, a primary reason for extending absolute immunity to
prosecutors today is historical. 8 In 1976, the Supreme Court concluded that
the major federal statute for the protection of civil rights—42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, which was adopted by Congress in 1871 during the violence and
chaos of Reconstruction—was intended to preserve the absolute immunities
enjoyed by public officials under the existing common law.9 But in 1871,
prosecutors did not enjoy absolute immunity. 10 In fact, the first case
affording prosecutors absolute immunity was not decided until twenty-five
years after the adoption of § 1983. 11 Indeed, in 1871, the Reconstruction
Congress adopted § 1983 in part to address the abusive practice in the South
of prosecuting Union officers and officials who were attempting to establish
and enforce civil rights for newly freed slaves. 12 In other words, the 1871
Congress did not intend to immunize prosecutors from liability. To the
contrary, Congress intended to subject prosecutors to civil liability for using
criminal prosecutions to thwart Reconstruction and deprive newly freed
slaves of their newly gained civil rights. 13 Thus, the notion that absolute
immunity is historically justified is just plain wrong.
Third, the current doctrine of prosecutorial immunity is not only
questionable as a matter of public policy and unjustified as a matter of
history, it also creates confusion and conflicts which cause uncertainty and
unnecessarily protracted litigation.14 Rather than streamlining the process
5. See infra Part I.
6. See infra Part I.
7. See infra Part I.
8. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 489–90 (1991); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,
421–24 (1976).
9. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 417–18.
10. Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005 BYU L.
REV. 53, 107–22; see infra Part II.
11. See generally Griffith v. Slinkard, 44 N.E. 1001 (Ind. 1896).
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part III.
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to facilitate the early resolution of claims as was intended, the doctrine
complicates and prolongs the process.15 Specifically, the current doctrine
affords prosecutors qualified immunity in some instances and absolute
immunity in others. 16 But the difficulty of drawing lines between cases
where qualified immunity applies and those where absolute immunity
applies generates needless litigation.17 Within eighteen months, the
Roberts Court granted certiorari in two prosecutorial immunity cases.18
Both cases illustrate the conflicts and complexities of the current
prosecutorial immunity doctrine. 19 A simplified approach—applying
qualified immunity in all cases—would serve public policy, respect
historical understandings, and simplify and streamline civil rights litigation.
This Article considers each of these points. First, in Part I, it evaluates
the mounting evidence that prosecutorial misconduct is the cause of a
substantial number of wrongful convictions, and existing legal mechanisms
are insufficient to deter or remedy that misconduct. Part II considers the
lack of historical justification for the Supreme Court’s recognition of the
absolute prosecutorial immunity doctrine. Finally, Part III addresses the
unnecessary conflicts and confusion generated by the current doctrine of
prosecutorial immunity and the benefits of its replacement with the uniform
application of qualified immunity.
I. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IS A SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM LACKING
EFFECTIVE DETERRENT OR REMEDIAL SAFEGUARDS
In public debates about prosecutorial immunity, the frequency and
significance of prosecutorial misconduct are disputed and sometimes
trivialized. 20 But as recent studies establish, prosecutorial misconduct is a
problem that contributes to a substantial number of wrongful convictions.21
Moreover, despite layers of corrective procedures, our current criminal and
civil justice process is ineffective in deterring or remedying prosecutorial
misconduct. 22

15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part III.
18. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 415, 415 (2010); Pottawattamie County v. McGhee,
129 S. Ct. 2002, 2002 (2009) (settled and dismissed after oral argument).
19. See infra Part III.
20. Warren Diepraam, Prosecutorial Misconduct: It Is Not the Prosecutor’s Way, 47 S.
TEX. L. REV. 773, 773 (2006); Joshua Marquis, Should It Be Easier to Sue Prosecutors for
Misconduct?, CQ RESEARCHER, Nov. 9, 2007, at 953 (“Cases of intentional misconduct by
prosecutors are about as frequent as the number of cases of human rabies. For that very
reason it’s big news when a district attorney engages in actual misconduct.”). But see D.
Brooks Smith, Policing Prosecutors: What Role Can Appellate Courts Play?, 38 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 835, 836 n.6 (2010) (Judge Smith, who serves on the Third Circuit, notes that
“[e]xamples of prosecutorial misconduct are not uncommon” and that “[t]he list [of
examples] is, unfortunately, lengthy.”).
21. See infra Part I.A.
22. See infra Part I.B.
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A. Prosecutorial Misconduct Is a Significant Problem
As the 2009 report of the Justice Project observed, “prosecutorial
misconduct was a factor in dismissed charges, reversed convictions, or
reduced sentences in at least 2,012 cases since 1970.” 23 From 1992–2011,
using DNA evidence, the Innocence Project at Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law has exonerated 273 people who were wrongfully convicted24
and has reported that prosecutorial misconduct is a leading cause of these
wrongful convictions. 25 One Innocence Project report concluded that 250
innocent people exonerated by DNA evidence had served 3,160 years in
prison. 26 According to Northwestern University’s Center on Wrongful
Convictions, about 50 people each year are exonerated in both DNA and
non-DNA cases. 27 The director of Cardozo Law School’s Jacob Burns
Ethics Center reported that of 180 DNA exonerations, 43 percent involved
allegations of prosecutorial misconduct.28
These conclusions are borne out by two recent California reports. In
2007, the California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice,
established by the California State Senate to study ways to prevent
wrongful convictions, issued its report. 29 The Commission found that in
the preceding decade, California appellate courts found prosecutorial
misconduct in 443 cases. 30 Of these cases, the courts found the misconduct
had been harmless in 390 cases, but had reversed convictions in 53 cases. 31
Most recently, in 2010, the Northern California Innocence Project released
its study of prosecutorial misconduct, 32 the most comprehensive review of
state prosecutorial misconduct in the United States. 33 The Innocence
Project reviewed more than 4,000 California state and federal appellate

23. JOHN F. TERZANO ET AL., JUSTICE PROJECT, IMPROVING PROSECUTORIAL
ACCOUNTABILITY: A POLICY REVIEW 2 (2009), available at http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/
JusticeProjectReport.pdf.
24. Know the Cases, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/ (last
visited Oct. 20, 2011).
25. See EMILY M. WEST, INNOCENCE PROJECT, COURT FINDINGS OF PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT CLAIMS IN POST-CONVICTION APPEALS AND CIVIL SUITS AMONG THE FIRST 255
DNA EXONERATION CASES 1 (2010), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/
docs/Innocence_Project_Pros_Misconduct.pdf; see also Johns, supra note 10, at 59–63
(summarizing studies of wrongful convictions and prosecutorial misconduct).
26. INNOCENCE PROJECT, 250 EXONERATED: TOO MANY WRONGFULLY CONVICTED 3
(2010), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/InnocenceProject_250.pdf.
27. Kevin Davis, The Real World, ABA J., Jan. 2011, at 51, 53.
28. Panelists Examine Why Prosecutors Are Largely Ignored by Disciplinary Officials,
74 U.S.L.W. 2526, 2526 (Mar. 7, 2006) (quoting Professor Ellen Yaroshefsky).
29. CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON
REPORTING MISCONDUCT 3 (2007), available at http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/
reports/prosecutorial/official/OFFICIAL REPORT ON REPORTING MISCONDUCT.pdf.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See generally KATHLEEN M. RIDOLFI & MAURICE POSSLEY, N. CAL. INNOCENCE
PROJECT, PREVENTABLE ERROR: A REPORT ON PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA
1997–2009 (2010), available at http://law.scu.edu/ncip/file/ProsecutorialMisconduct_
BookEntire_online version.pdf.
33. Id. at 2.
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decisions between 1997–2009 alleging prosecutorial misconduct.34 The
study found that in about 3,000 cases, the courts did not find prosecutorial
misconduct; but that in 707 cases, the courts did find such misconduct.35
Moreover, in another 282 cases, the courts did not resolve the question.36
The finding of 707 cases of misconduct is significant—it equates to one
case of prosecutorial misconduct each week in California alone.37 This
study was followed up by an annual report for 2010 documenting 130
judicial findings of prosecutorial misconduct in 102 cases, 26 of which
resulted in reversals of convictions, orders for new trial, or orders barring
prosecution evidence. 38
But these reports grossly underestimate the instances of prosecutorial
misconduct for several reasons. First, only about 3 percent of felony cases
actually go to trial, so there will be no judicial scrutiny of 97 percent of
cases, almost all of which are resolved through guilty pleas. 39 Second, for
the first five years of the eleven-year study, more than 90 percent of the
California appellate decisions were not entered into legal databases.40
Third, findings of misconduct at the trial court level (but not discussed in
appellate decisions) are inaccessible.41 Finally, the numbers fail to reflect
the instances of prosecutorial misconduct that were never discovered or
appealed. 42
The failure to discover prosecutorial misconduct is especially likely in
cases of Brady violations. 43 In 1963, the Supreme Court held that
prosecutors have the duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to defendants.44
But the failure to do so is a prevalent example of prosecutorial
misconduct. 45 As the Innocence Project observed:
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. In many of these cases, the court declined to review the claim of misconduct
because defense counsel had failed to object to the misconduct at trial. Id. at 38, 40.
37. Id. at 2.
38. MAURICE POSSLEY & JESSICA SEARGEANT, N. CAL. INNONCENCE PROJECT, FIRST
ANNUAL REPORT: PREVENTABLE ERROR—PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA
2010, at 3 (2011), available at http://www.veritasinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/
ProsecutorialMisconduct_FirstAnnual_Final8.pdf.
39. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 32, at 3.
40. Id. at 10–11.
41. Id. at 3.
42. Id.
43. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963); see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409, 443–44 (1976) (White, J., concurring) (“The judicial process will by definition be
ignorant of the [Brady] violation when it occurs; and it is reasonable to suspect that most
such violations never surface. It is all the more important, then, to deter such violations by
permitting damage actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to be maintained in instances where
violations do surface.”).
44. Brady, 373 U.S. at 86.
45. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 32, at 36–38, 65. A study of all 5,760 capital
convictions in the United States found that 16 percent of reversals in post-conviction
proceedings were for Brady violations. Id. at 37. The California Innocence Project study
found 66 cases of Brady violations. Id. Indeed, of the six instances of discipline for
prosecutorial misconduct from 1997–2009, all six involved Brady violations. Id. at 55.
Other instances of Brady violations escaped any discipline. Id. at 55–56. But see Rachel E.
Barkow, Organizational Guidelines for the Prosecutor’s Office, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2089,
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When prosecutors make the decision as to whether evidence is Brady
material, their belief that the defendant is guilty can create a distorting
prism through which they tend to view the evidence inaccurately as a red
herring or irrelevant. Brady violations are, by their nature, difficult to
uncover; they become apparent only when the withheld material becomes
known in other ways. 46

For these reasons, Brady violations often go undetected. 47 For example,
in one recent California case, 48 the Court of Appeal reversed a defendant’s
conviction for child molestation because the deputy district attorney
withheld a videotape of the victim’s medical exam supporting the defense
expert’s conclusion that no sexual assault had occurred. 49 The discovery of
that one undisclosed videotape led to the discovery of more than 3,000
other videotapes that had never been turned over to other defendants. 50
While the frequency of prosecutorial misconduct is difficult to determine,
the fact of prosecutorial misconduct imposes extraordinary costs and
consequences on the criminal justice system. First, of course, are the
2092 (2010) (explaining the reasons an honest prosecutor may fail to disclose exculpatory
evidence).
46. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 32, at 36. Because Brady violations are so difficult
to discover and police, scholars have suggested various preventative and corrective reforms.
See Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 499 (2009)
(explaining that the Brady materiality requirement leads to the systematic under-disclosure
of exculpatory evidence and proposing a prophylactic open-file rule); Sara Gurwitch, When
Self-Policing Does Not Work: A Proposal for Policing Prosecutors in Their Obligation to
Provide Exculpatory Evidence to the Defense, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 303, 320–21 (2010)
(arguing that the indictment should be dismissed in cases where willful Brady violations
have prejudiced the defendant).
47. The hidden nature of Brady violations is especially problematic. See Barkow, supra
note 45, at 2092–94. In many other categories of prosecutorial misconduct, the misconduct
occurs in open court where defense counsel and the trial court have an opportunity to
observe and correct the misconduct, and the appellate court has an opportunity to review it
based on the trial court record. These categories of misconduct include
eliciting inadmissible evidence in witness examination; vouching for a witness’s
truthfulness; testifying for an absent witness; misstating the law; arguing facts not
in evidence; mischaracterizing evidence; shifting the burden of proof; impugning
the defense; arguing inconsistent theories of prosecution; appealing to religious
authority; offering personal opinion; [and] engaging in discriminatory jury
selection . . . .
RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 32, at 25.
48. People v. Uribe, 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d 829 (Ct. App. 2008).
49. Id. at 846–47. See RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 32, at 20 (citing Tracey Kaplan,
Sex Abuse Conviction Dismissed, DA Berated Citing “Numerous Acts of Misconduct,”
Judge Orders Man Freed After Serving Four Years of a Possible Life Sentence, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 7, 2010, at 1A). On remand, the case was dismissed; the dismissal in
now on appeal. Id.
50. See RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 32 (citing Tracey Kaplan, Judge Orders New
Trial in Second Case as Before, Tape of Exam Wasn’t Given to Defense, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, Oct. 30, 2009, at 1B). Another example is the case of Alan Gell who was exonerated
after “nine years in prison and half of that on death row” for murder. See Robert P.
Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarment of Mike Nifong:
The Critical Importance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 257, 263
(2008). Prosecutors withheld witness statements that the victim was seen alive after Gell
was with him and that they were creating stories to disguise their own involvement. Id. at
264–65.
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devastating consequences for the innocent person wrongfully convicted as a
result of prosecutorial misconduct. Simply put, their lives are ruined.
Many have spent years in prison before being exonerated. 51 Many innocent
people are currently in prison who have yet to be—and may never be—
exonerated. Innocent people in prison lose their freedom, their ties to
family and friends, their employment, their educational opportunities and
job skills, and often their physical and mental health.52
Crime victims and their families also suffer as a result of prosecutorial
misconduct.
Enduring the lengthy appellate process, reversals of
convictions, and retrials is emotionally wrenching. Where the defendant is
exonerated, the victim knows that the criminal perpetrator has escaped
justice and is likely still at large. And even where the prosecutorial
misconduct does not result in exoneration, the prosecutor’s case has often
been undermined by the passage of time; the ultimate sentence of the
defendant will often be reduced through a plea bargain since the prosecutor
will be unable to retry the case.53
Where prosecutorial misconduct has caused the wrongful conviction of
innocent people, the danger to public safety is obvious: the real criminals
remain free to commit other crimes. Specifically, in cases of DNA
exonerations, authorities have found that many of the true criminals
committed other crimes while innocent people were incarcerated for their
original crimes. 54 A horrifying example is the case of Kevin Green.55 In
1980, Green was wrongfully convicted for assaulting his pregnant wife and
murdering her unborn baby. 56 He served sixteen years in prison until he
was exonerated. 57 By that time, the police had discovered that the real
criminal was Gerald Parker, who had committed five murders before the
attack on Green’s wife. 58 While Green was being wrongfully prosecuted
and convicted, Parker continued to commit violent crimes, including raping
a thirteen-year-old girl. 59
As the Innocence Project study found, prosecutorial misconduct burdens
taxpayers in several ways. First, prolonged criminal prosecutions—
sometimes lasting decades through appeals and retrials—are enormously
expensive. 60 Second, the cost of incarcerating defendants through lengthy
51. Know the Cases: Browse Profiles, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocence
project.org/know/Browse-Profiles.php (last visited Oct. 20, 2011) (documenting all the cases
of exoneration by DNA evidence).
52. See RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 32, at 66; Adam I. Kaplan, Comment, The Case
for Comparative Fault in Compensating the Wrongfully Convicted, 56 UCLA L. REV. 227,
232 (2008); see also Janet Roberts & Elizabeth Stanton, A Long Road Back After
Exoneration, and Justice Is Slow to Make Amends, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2007, at 38.
53. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 32, at 70.
54. Id. at 71.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 67–68. In one case—which has been litigated for thirty years—a defendant
was granted a retrial on murder charges because the prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory
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prosecutions—as well as the cost of incarcerating innocent people who are
wrongfully convicted—is substantial. In California, incarceration costs
$45,000 per year per inmate. 61 In addition, the taxpayers may be liable for
damages in civil lawsuits 62 and under wrongful imprisonment statutes.63
Finally, prosecutorial misconduct erodes the integrity of, and public
confidence in, the criminal justice system as a whole. 64 The undermining
of the public’s confidence is exacerbated by the fact that minorities and the
poor suffer the most from prosecutorial misconduct. 65 In our system, the
prosecutor “is the representative . . . of a sovereignty whose . . . interest,
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done.” 66 As the Innocence Project observed:
Prosecutorial misconduct is wrong. It is not excusable as a means to
convict the guilty, and it is abhorrent in the conviction of the innocent. It
has no place in a criminal justice system that strives to be fair, to
accurately convict the guilty and to protect the innocent. It undercuts the
public trust and impugns the reputations of the majority of prosecutors,
who uphold the law and live up to their obligations to seek justice. 67

B. Existing Deterrent and Remedial Mechanisms Are Ineffective
In 1976, when the Supreme Court adopted absolute prosecutorial
immunity, it concluded that the burden and distraction of potential civil
liability was not warranted because other deterrent and remedial
mechanisms would be adequate to safeguard the accused’s rights.68
Specifically, the Court pointed to “the remedial powers of the trial judge,
appellate review, and state and federal post-conviction collateral
remedies”; 69 the prospect of professional discipline; 70 and the potential
criminal liability of prosecutors for violating the accused’s rights.71 But as

evidence and introduced false evidence. Id. at 68. The cost of prosecution has exceeded $1
million. Id.
61. Id. at 68.
62. Id. at 66. While establishing civil liability is extremely difficult because of the
immunity doctrine, if immunity can be overcome, potential liability can be very high. Id. at
66, 68–70.
63. Id. at 70.
64. Id. at 71.
65. JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND HOW TO
MAKE IT RIGHT 318 (2003) (explaining that prosecutorial misconduct happens more
frequently in the conviction of black men); Arthur L. Rizer III, The Race Effect on Wrongful
Convictions, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 845, 856–58 (2003); Ephraim Unell, Note, A Right
Not to Be Framed: Preserving Civil Liability of Prosecutors in the Face of Absolute
Immunity, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 955, 956–57 (2010).
66. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
67. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 32, at 6.
68. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 425–29 (1976); see also Burns v. Reed, 500
U.S. 478, 492 (1991) (“‘[T]he safeguards built into the judicial system tend to reduce the
need for private damages actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct.’”
(alteration in original) (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978))).
69. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427.
70. Id. at 428–29.
71. Id.
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the following discussion will explain, these deterrent and corrective
mechanisms are entirely inadequate.
First, the courts’ remedial powers are not available in the 97 percent of
cases that never go to trial, so the protections of trial and appellate court
scrutiny are only available in 3 percent of cases. 72 Moreover, even when
prosecutorial misconduct is found by the courts of appeals, the offense is
found to be harmless in most of those cases, so the conviction stands. In
fact, for the 707 cases in California where prosecutorial misconduct was
found to have been committed, the appellate courts found the error to be
harmless and upheld the conviction in nearly 80 percent of the cases. 73
In his article outlining the limited ability of appellate courts to police
prosecutorial misconduct, Judge D. Brooks Smith of the Third Circuit
described the doctrine of harmless error as “the elephant in the room.” 74 A
finding of “harmless error” is not equivalent to a finding of trivial error.75
Indeed, harmless error cases often reveal serious prosecutorial
misconduct. 76 For example, in one California case, the court found
harmless error despite the prosecutor’s repeated and persistent misconduct
in pursuing an improper line of questioning. 77 In the court’s view, the
prosecutor “instilled a poison which the defense could not drain from the
case.” 78 But the conviction was, nonetheless, affirmed. The Innocence
Project study documents a number of cases where egregious misconduct
was found to be harmless. 79 When they label such prosecutorial
misconduct as harmless error, the trial and appellate courts neither deter nor
remedy that misconduct.
Moreover, in cases of harmless error, professional discipline also fails to
punish or deter misconduct in many states. For example, in California, a
court is only required to report prosecutorial misconduct where there is a
reversal or modification of the judgment as a result of the misconduct.80
The majority of the 707 instances of misconduct found by the Innocence
Project were not required to be reported because 548 of them were not

72. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 32, at 10.
73. Id. at 12–13.
74. Smith, supra note 20, at 836–40 (“The nature of harmless error review and
concomitant limitations on our supervisory authority profoundly limit the reach of a court of
appeals when it confronts most claims of prosecutorial misconduct.”).
75. Harmless error is found where the court finds that despite the constitutional error, an
automatic reversal of the conviction is not constitutionally required; harmful error is found
where the error has resulted in a miscarriage of justice because “‘it is reasonably probable
that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of
the error.’” RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 32, at 19 (quoting People v. Watson, 299 P.2d
243, 254 (Cal. 1956)). This is a high hurdle to overcome since a showing that the error may
well have influenced the outcome is insufficient.
76. Id. at 21–23, 26–28, 31, 36–37.
77. See People v. McKenzie, No. A112837, 2007 WL 2193548, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App.
Aug. 1, 2007); RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 32, at 21.
78. McKenzie, 2007 WL 2193548, at *8.
79. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 32, at 22–24.
80. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6086.7 (West 2003 & Supp. 2011); RIDOLFI &
POSSLEY, supra note 32, at 22.
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covered by the limited statutory reporting requirement.81 Indeed, in the
thirteen-year period covered by the study, there were no reports of
discipline for any of those 548 instances, all of which were found to be
harmless error. 82
In a number of cases where prosecutorial misconduct was found to be
harmless, the accused were in fact innocent. 83 In a 2010 study of persons
exonerated by DNA evidence, the issue of prosecutorial misconduct had
been raised in sixty-five of them, but rejected in thirty-four of them. 84 In
the thirty-one cases where the courts found prosecutorial misconduct, it was
found to be harmless in nineteen cases. 85 Of these sixty-five cases of
wrongful convictions, only twelve found harmful error. 86 Yet all sixty-five
of these people were actually innocent.
The failure of the courts or disciplinary bodies to deter or remedy
prosecutorial misconduct is equally apparent in cases where harmful error is
Despite their statutory obligation to report prosecutorial
found. 87
misconduct in cases of harmful error, judges routinely ignore their
responsibility. Specifically, California judges are required to report
prosecutorial misconduct that results in reversals,88 but a review of thirty
cases in which convictions had been reversed for prosecutorial misconduct
revealed that not a single one had been reported to the state bar.89
Moreover, from 1997–2009, appellate courts found 159 instances of
harmful prosecutorial misconduct,90 but only six prosecutors were
disciplined for misconduct during criminal proceedings. 91
The lack of discipline for prosecutorial misconduct is remarkable. In
California, attorneys were publicly disciplined 4,741 times from 1997–
2009. 92 But only ten instances of public discipline involved prosecutors,
and only six of those cases involved the handling of a criminal case.93 To
put those numbers in perspective, appellate courts found prosecutorial
81. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 32, at 48.
82. Id. at 22, 48.
83. Id. at 64.
84. Id. at 65.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Barkow, supra note 45, at 2095 (explaining that a nationwide study of all reported
cases found only twenty-seven where prosecutors were disciplined for unethical behavior
that compromised the fairness of a trial (citing Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional
Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721, 751 tbl.VI, 753 tbl.VII (2001))).
88. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6086.7 (West 2003 & Supp. 2011).
89. See RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 32, at 49 (citing CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR
ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT (Gerald Uelmen ed., 2008), available at
http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/CCFAJFinalReport.pdf); see also Barkow, supra note 45, at
2096 (providing some reasons why judges may be reluctant to report prosecutors to
disciplinary bodies); Pamela A. MacLean, Sins of Omission, CAL. LAW., Aug. 2009, at 26,
26–30 (discussing the commission findings of misconduct, failure to disclose exculpatory
evidence, and a failure to report prosecutorial misconduct).
90. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 32, at 18.
91. Id. at 16.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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misconduct in over 700 criminal cases, but only six prosecutors were
disciplined. 94 In other words, less than 1 percent of the prosecutors
formally found to have engaged in misconduct faced any professional
sanction for it. 95
Even where prosecutors were repeatedly found to have engaged in
prosecutorial misconduct, they were still not reported or disciplined.96 The
Innocence Project report found sixty-seven prosecutors whom appellate
courts had found to have committed misconduct repeatedly—some as many
as five times, but only a few were disciplined.97 There is a certain irony in
this lack of discipline of those charged with enforcing the law: prosecutors
escape discipline while non-prosecutors are vigorously disciplined. 98 For
example, one attorney was suspended for twenty months for bouncing a
check in his personal account, 99 and a criminal defense attorney was
suspended for two years for crossing the line between zealous advocacy and
contempt of court. 100 But deputy district attorney Rosalie Morton was
never disciplined even though she was repeatedly found to have engaged in
prosecutorial misconduct, resulting in the reversal of three convictions
under the harmful error standard. 101
Putting recent findings in historical context, the lack of professional
discipline is clear. Prior to 2005 in California—the largest bar association
in the United States 102—“not a single prosecutor was disciplined for
[mis]conduct in a criminal case.” 103 And, “to date, no California prosecutor
has been disbarred for prosecutorial misconduct.” 104 In 1976, the Supreme
Court confidently asserted, “[A] prosecutor stands perhaps unique, among
officials whose acts could deprive persons of constitutional rights, in his
amenability to professional discipline by an association of his peers.”105 In
2011, we know that this is simply not true. In reality, prosecutors who
engage in misconduct—even when found to have engaged in misconduct by
courts of appeals—are subject to discipline less than 1 percent of the
time. 106
In the past few years, two cases have spotlighted the issue of
prosecutorial misconduct: the Duke Lacrosse case and the Ted Stevens
case. In 2007, in the Duke Lacrosse case, the prosecuting attorney was
disbarred for misconduct in withholding exculpatory evidence and making
inflammatory public statements. 107 Specifically, despite repeated requests
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 57–58.
Id. at 3, 57.
Id. at 59–60.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 59–60.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 56.
Id.
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976).
RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 32, at 3.
TERZANO ET AL., supra note 23, at 9.
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from defense counsel, the prosecutor failed to disclose reports of DNA
testing that indicated that the DNA evidence found on the rape victim did
not match that of the three defendants in the case. 108 Withholding
exonerating evidence is one of the most common types of prosecutorial
misconduct. 109 What is unusual is that the state bar acted quickly and
decisively to punish the prosecutor. 110
In 2009, Attorney General Eric Holder dismissed an indictment against
former Senator Ted Stevens because of prosecutorial misconduct.111
Again, as in the Duke Lacrosse case, the prosecutors repeatedly failed to
provide evidence to defense counsel despite court orders to do so. 112
Attorney General Holder ordered an internal review of the prosecutors’
conduct, and the trial judge handling the case appointed its own prosecutor
to investigate whether the government prosecutors should face criminal
contempt charges. 113 He stated that “[i]n twenty-five years on the bench I
have never seen anything approaching the mishandling and misconduct that
I have seen in this case.” 114 Again, unfortunately, the response of Attorney
General Holder and Judge Emmett Sullivan in addressing the misconduct is
more remarkable than the misconduct itself.115
The possibility of criminal consequences is the last remedy cited by the
Supreme Court in determining that civil rights liability is unnecessary to
deter prosecutorial misconduct.116 This theoretical deterrent is in practice
nonexistent. The Court pointed out that government officials, including
prosecutors, can be criminally prosecuted for violating constitutional
protections under 18 U.S.C. § 242. 117 But it failed to cite a single case
where prosecutors had actually been held criminally liable.118 In fact, in
the 150 years since its adoption in 1866, 119 it appears that only one
prosecutor has been convicted under this statute.120

108. Id.
109. Id. at 2, 9.
110. Id. at 9.
111. Id. at 12.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. (alteration in original).
115. Id. at 2, 12.
116. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 428–29 (1976).
117. Id. at 429.
118. See id.
119. Section 242 was originally adopted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. See ch.
31, 14 Stat. 27, 27. It was readopted after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment as part
of the 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180–85 (1961); see also
Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights—Will the
Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 5, 7 (1985).
120. Brophy v. Comm. on Prof’l Standards, 442 N.Y.S.2d 818, 818 (App. Div. 1981); see
Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A
Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 703 n.56, 726 (1987); Smith, supra note 20, at 840
(observing that the Supreme Court’s reminder that criminal prosecution was available for
prosecutorial misconduct “seems small comfort to an appeals court that confronts
prosecutorial wrongdoing, the lion’s share of which does not rise to the level of a criminal
offense”).
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In short, despite the Supreme Court’s confidence in 1976 that existing
legal mechanisms were sufficient to offset the dangers of granting
prosecutors absolute immunity, 121 current studies have established that
existing safeguards and remedies are totally inadequate. First, since 97
percent of the cases never go to trial, 97 percent of defendants lack the
protections of trial court supervision, appellate review, and collateral
proceedings. 122 Second, many instances of prosecutorial misconduct—
including Brady violations—are extremely difficult to uncover and never
come to light in court proceedings. Third, even where cases go to trial and
prosecutorial misconduct is established on appeal, it is rarely found to
constitute harmful—and therefore reversible—error. Fourth, even where
prosecutorial misconduct is found on appeal to constitute harmful and
reversible error, it is rarely reported to disciplinary bodies. Prosecutors are
almost never subjected to professional discipline—even where the
misconduct constitutes harmful error. And finally, criminal prosecutions
for prosecutorial misconduct virtually never happen.
II. ABSOLUTE PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY IS HISTORICALLY UNJUSTIFIED
In litigation under the major federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
prosecutors enjoy either absolute or qualified immunity depending on the
function they are performing at the time of their alleged misconduct.123
When acting as advocates, prosecutors receive absolute immunity even
when they have acted intentionally and maliciously. 124 When acting as
investigators or administrators, prosecutors receive qualified immunity,
which protects them from liability unless they violated clearly established
law of which a reasonable prosecutor would have known. 125 In adopting
this scheme, the Supreme Court relied heavily on historical justifications.
This section explains that the Court’s historical justification for recognizing
absolute prosecutorial immunity is just plain wrong.
Section 1983—section 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act—was adopted in 1871
to provide a federal civil remedy for civil rights violations. The Court has
repeatedly held that § 1983 must be interpreted in light of its historical
context. While noting that § 1983’s text provides for no immunities, the
Court has concluded that Congress intended to preserve the well-established
common law immunities that existed when the statute was enacted. 126 But
the Court has stressed that when “a tradition of absolute immunity did not
exist as of 1871, we have refused to grant such immunity under § 1983.”127
Moreover, because the undisputed purpose of § 1983 was to create liability

121. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 425–29.
122. RIDOLFI & POSSLEY, supra note 32, at 10.
123. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127–29 (1997); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509
U.S. 259, 268–69 (1993); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991).
124. See Kalina, 522 U.S. at 124; Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427.
125. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268–70.
126. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1951) (upholding legislative
immunity).
127. Burns, 500 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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for unlawful conduct of state officials, the Court has always emphasized
that it would confer absolute immunity sparingly. 128
The common law as of 1871 did not confer absolute immunity for
prosecutorial misconduct. Indeed, no court adopted absolute prosecutorial
immunity until 1896—twenty-five years after the adoption of § 1983. 129 In
fact, in 1871, although the office of the public prosecutor existed, the
private prosecution of crimes was widespread, 130 and both public and
private prosecutors were liable for malicious prosecution. 131 Indeed, as one
court observed, it was especially appropriate and necessary to hold
prosecutors liable for malicious prosecutions given their power and the
need to hold them accountable for the abuse of that power. 132
Although the common law did not provide absolute immunity for persons
responsible for a criminal prosecution, prosecutors were protected from
excessive liability because the elements of the cause of action were difficult
to prove. To establish a claim for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff had to
prove that the prosecutor acted without probable cause and with malice.133
This high bar for liability served the policy of encouraging persons to act as
private prosecutors to protect the community. Given the burdens of proof,
an action for malicious prosecution essentially incorporated the elements of
qualified immunity. 134 If the plaintiff satisfied the heavy burden of proof,
however, the plaintiff would “ordinarily be handsomely rewarded. . . . [for]
the outrageous character of the defendant’s conduct.” 135
While the common law in 1871 allowed tort actions against prosecutors
for malicious prosecution, this remedy was meaningless in the South
following the Civil War because the former Confederate states were
aggressively using civil and criminal prosecutions to obstruct federal
128. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 434 (White, J., concurring) (“[T]o extend absolute immunity
to any [class] of state officials is to negate pro tanto the very remedy which it appears
Congress sought to create.”).
129. See Griffith v. Slinkard, 44 N.E. 1001, 1001–02 (Ind. 1896) (holding that a
prosecutor was entitled to absolute immunity); see also Burns, 500 U.S. at 499 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
130. See Johns, supra note 10, at 108–14.
131. Id. at 113; see Parker v. Huntington, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 124, 127–28 (1854) (holding
that where plaintiff accused the District Attorney and another defendant of lying to the court
to obtain his indictment for perjury, “[t]he plaintiff can maintain his case by proof of a
malicious prosecution by both or either of the defendants”).
132. Wood v. Weir, 44 Ky. (5 B. Mon.) 544, 547 (1845) (“It is contended, that this rule
[recognizing liability for malicious prosecution] will expose attorneys to perplexing
litigation, to the manifest injury of the profession. If it should, the law knows no distinction
of persons; a different rule cannot, as to them, be recognized by this Court, from that which
is applicable to others. Besides, this is a numerous class, powerful for good or evil, and
holding them to a strict accountability, will have the effect to exalt and dignify the
profession, by purging it of ignorant, meretricious and reckless members.”).
133. 1 FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF TORTS OR PRIVATE WRONGS 480–81 (1859); see 3
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *126; MARTIN L. NEWELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, FALSE IMPRISONMENT, AND THE ABUSE OF LEGAL PROCESS 21–
22 (1892); Fowler Harper, Malicious Prosecution, False Imprisonment and Defamation, 15
TEX. L. REV. 157, 165–70 (1937).
134. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 133 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring).
135. Harper, supra note 133, at 170.
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enforcement of civil rights. During Reconstruction, Congress sought to
restructure the nation by eliminating slavery, 136 granting former slaves
citizenship, 137 and providing effective redress for the deprivation of civil
rights. 138 But this effort met fierce and violent resistance. 139 Former
Confederates seized control in many parts of the South and launched
aggressive campaigns against newly freed slaves, Republicans, Union
supporters, and federal officials. 140 These anti-Reconstruction campaigns
included state-sanctioned criminal prosecutions of Union officers and
federal officials for attempting to enforce federal laws. 141
Southern states used their judicial systems to frustrate Reconstruction and
intimidate federal officers. Federal officials often were criminally
prosecuted for arresting southern violators of the Civil Rights Acts.142
Southern prosecutors also targeted Union military commanders and
officials of the Freedmen’s Bureau who sought to enforce the 1866 Civil
Rights Act. 143 News of these malicious prosecutions reached the highest
officials in Washington. For example, in 1866, United States Attorney
Benjamin H. Bristow wrote to Attorney General James Speed to explain
that, in the South, state prosecutions were being initiated against Union
supporters and federal officials in an apparently concerted attempt to force
them to leave the state.144 In Kentucky, as one newspaper explained,
Confederates and their sympathizers “have possession of the courts; they
constitute the juries; they are legislators, judges, magistrates, sheriffs,
constables, jurors, and with the spirit of disloyalty, they intend to take
vengeance upon those who have been zealous in the cause of the Union.”145
General John M. Palmer, the Union military commander in Kentucky,
136. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1; AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A
BIOGRAPHY 358–59 (2005).
137. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; AMAR, supra note 136, at 380–81.
138. Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006));
AMAR, supra note 136, at 362, 381.
139. Gabriel J. Chin & Randy Wagner, The Tyranny of the Minority: Jim Crow and the
Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 65, 88–89 (2008); James
Forman, Jr., Juries and Race in the Nineteenth Century, 113 YALE L.J. 895, 914–26 (2004);
Russell Glazer, Comment, The Sherman Amendment:
Congressional Rejection of
Communal Liability for Civil Rights Violations, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1371, 1371–73 (1992);
Eric A. Harrington, Note, Judicial Misuse of History and § 1983: Toward a Purpose-Based
Approach, 85 TEX. L. REV. 999, 1004–06 (2007).
140. AMAR, supra note 136, at 377–78; Chin & Wagner, supra note 139, at 88–89;
Forman, supra note 139, at 914–26; Glazer, supra note 139, at 1371–73; Harrington, supra
note 139, at 1004–06.
141. See S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 39-2, at 5 (1865) (describing groups of “incorrigibles” who
“persecute Union men and negroes whenever they can do so with impunity”); David
Achtenberg, With Malice Toward Some: United States v. Kirby, Malicious Prosecution, and
the Fourteenth Amendment, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 273, 275 (1995).
142. See ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE
FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866–1876, at 23 (2005).
143. See 1 MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 441 (2d ed. 2002) (describing reports of
“countless” lawsuits by Southerners against federal officials).
144. See Achtenberg, supra note 141, at 329.
145. Id. at 298.
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wrote directly to Attorney General Speed to relate that he had repeatedly
been indicted for “aiding slaves escape” merely because he had issued
travel passes to former slaves. 146 As he explained, “there are twenty
thousand crimes for which I am punishable and Congress will have to pass
a law extending my life—lengthen it out a few thousand years that I may
[serve] this punishment.” 147 More than three thousand prosecutions were
brought in Kentucky alone against former Union soldiers.148
In response to this flood of prosecutions, General Ulysses S. Grant issued
an order forbidding state courts from prosecuting federal officials for
actions taken within the scope of their authorized duties.149 The Order
further sought to curb state prosecutors’ abuse of the judicial system by
requiring them to treat freed slaves in the “same manner and degree” as
every other citizen. 150 These abuses of the judicial system were so
pervasive that, as part of the first Civil Rights Act, Congress gave federal
authorities the power to take control of state criminal prosecutions if a fair
result could not be achieved. 151 During the first year this law was in effect,
the Commissioner of the Freedman’s Bureau, the agency charged with
handling the administration of cases removed from state court, estimated
that their courts handled 100,000 complaints concerning abusive state
actions. 152
Congress, too, was well aware of Southern prosecutors’ aggressive abuse
of the judicial process. During the debates on the 1866 amendments to the
Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, Senator Lyman Trumbull, Chair of the
Judiciary Committee, urged action because “thousands” of “loyal men”
were subjected to baseless civil and criminal prosecutions. 153 As Congress
debated the Civil Rights Act of 1866, representatives expressed concern
about the vexatious use of prosecutions against Union supporters and
federal officials. 154 In recommending the passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Joint Committee on Reconstruction stated:
146. Id. at 299.
147. Id.
148. See CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2054 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Wilson)
(attributing the numerous prosecutions to Kentucky’s refusal to transfer such cases to federal
court).
149. See General Grant’s Orders, General Orders, No. 3, War Dep’t, Adjunct General’s
Office, Washington, D.C., (Jan. 12, 1866), reprinted in EDWARD MCPHERSON, THE
POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION 122–23
(Washington, Solomons & Chapman 2d ed. 1875).
150. Id.
151. See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, 27.
152. See PATRICIA ALLAN LUCIE, FREEDOM AND FEDERALISM: CONGRESS AND COURTS
1861–1866, at 166 (1986).
153. See CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1983 (remarks of Sen. Trumbull). Senator
Trumbull knew the common law of his time, including that prosecutors could be liable for
their actions in tort. During his service as a Justice of the Illinois Supreme Court, he wrote
an opinion holding that “the law secures every person from unfounded arrests, maliciously
instituted against him without probable cause.” Jacks v. Stimpson, 13 Ill. 701, 704 (1852).
154. See CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2065 (remarks of Sen. Doolittle)
(describing the widespread nature of the problem of unfounded prosecutions against federal
officials); see also Achtenberg, supra note 141, at 338–42 (“[F]or the 39th Congress, the

2011]

UNSUPPORTABLE AND UNJUSTIFIED

525

Southern men who adhered to the Union are bitterly hated and relentlessly
persecuted. In some localities prosecutions have been instituted in State
courts against Union officers for acts done in the line of official duty, and
similar prosecutions are threatened elsewhere as soon as the United States
troops are removed. 155

To counter this anti-Union resistance, Congress sought a way to hold
hostile Southern officials accountable. In April 1866, Congress passed the
Civil Rights Act, which provided for criminal penalties against any person
who caused the deprivation of the rights of former slaves.156 But the
violence continued unabated. 157 Therefore, Congress—buttressed by the
constitutional authority of the Fourteenth Amendment, which was ratified
in 1868—expanded the scope of the 1866 Act by adding the civil liability
provision of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, which prohibited any person
from depriving any citizen of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured
by the Constitution. 158 These remedial provisions were intended to be
broadly construed. Thus, Representative Shellabarger declared:
This act is remedial, and in aid of the preservation of human liberty and
human rights. All statutes and constitutional provisions authorizing such
statutes are liberally and beneficently construed. . . . [T]he largest latitude
consistent with the words employed is uniformly given in construing such
statutes and constitutional provisions as are meant to protect and defend
and give remedies for their wrongs to all the people. 159

As this history shows, when § 1983 was adopted in 1871, the common
law did not recognize absolute prosecutorial immunity. In fact, prosecutors
were liable in common law tort actions for malicious prosecution.
Moreover, in adopting the Ku Klux Klan Act, Congress was addressing the
widespread practice in the South of using civil and criminal prosecutions to
thwart Reconstruction and the enforcement of federal civil rights laws.
problem of baseless prosecutions . . . was a pressing current crisis that provoked vigorous
debate and decisive legislative action.”).
155. REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. xvii–
xviii (1866).
156. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
157. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION: 1863–
1877, at 342 (1988) (quoting the former Governor of Louisiana as complaining in October
1866 that “murder and intimidation are the order of the day in this state”).
158. Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13, 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983). The 1871 Act also included criminal penalties for conspiring to violate civil rights,
authorized the President to send military forces to suppress violence aimed at depriving civil
rights of citizens and other persons, and authorized the suspension of habeas corpus for a
limited time. Id. §§ 2–4, 17 Stat. at 13–15.
159. CONG. GLOBE, 42ND CONG., 1ST SESS. APP’X 68 (1871); see also id. at 217 (remarks
of Sen. Thurman) (expressing his opposition by remarking that “there is no limitation
whatsoever upon the terms that are employed [in § 1983], and they are as comprehensive as
can be used”); CONG. GLOBE, 42ND CONG., 1ST SESS. 800 (remarks of Rep. Perry) (“Now, by
our action on this bill we have asserted as fully as we can assert the mischief intended to be
remedied.”); id. at 476 (remarks of Rep. Dawes) (the person who “invades, trenches upon, or
impairs one iota or tittle of the least of [constitutional rights], to that extent trenches upon the
Constitution and laws of the United States, and this Constitution authorizes us to bring him
before the courts to answer therefor”).
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State tort actions for malicious prosecution were meaningless in the face of
this abuse of power, so a federal remedy was required. Congress did not
intend to insulate Southern prosecutors from liability for these abusive
practices; on the contrary, it intended to provide a federal civil rights
remedy against them for prosecutorial misconduct. In 1871, Congress did
not intend to provide immunity for prosecutorial misconduct, but rather
intended to create a federal remedy establishing prosecutorial liability.
Indeed, while prosecutors were liable for malicious prosecution when
§ 1983 was adopted in 1871, the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial
immunity was unheard of for another twenty-five years, until a state court
in Indiana adopted it in Griffith v. Slinkard.160 Even after Griffith, the
common law regarding absolute prosecutorial immunity was not settled for
decades. For example, while Indiana adopted the doctrine in 1896, the next
year Kentucky concluded that prosecutors could be liable if they acted with
malice or corrupt motives.161 This split in authority persisted into the
1920s.162 California rejected absolute prosecutorial immunity in 1908,163
and Hawaii held that a public prosecutor could be liable for malicious
prosecution and rejected the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity in
1916.164 Oregon waffled a bit and then accepted the doctrine in 1924.165 In
the federal system, absolute prosecutorial immunity was not recognized
until 1927.166 In other words, absolute prosecutorial immunity was not well
established in 1871 and was not generally adopted until fifty years after the
enactment of § 1983.
In 1871 Congress could not have intended to retain a common law rule
that did not yet exist.167 And it certainly did not intend to insulate
prosecutors from liability for malicious prosecutions, since that was one of
the tactics of southern defiance to Reconstruction that the Ku Klux Klan
Act was intended to remedy. To the extent that the doctrine of absolute

160. 44 N.E. 1001 (Ind. 1896).
161. Arnold v. Hubble, 38 S.W. 1041, 1041 (Ky. Ct. App. 1897).
162. Douglas J. McNamara, Buckley, Imbler and Stare Decisis:
The Present
Predicament of Prosecutorial Immunity and an End to Its Absolute Means, 59 ALB. L. REV.
1135, 1169 (1996). See generally Annotation, Immunity of Prosecuting Officer from Action
for Malicious Prosecution, 34 A.L.R. 1504 (1925) (recognizing the split in authority and
collecting cases); Note, The Civil Liability of a District Attorney for Quasi-judicial Acts, 73
U. PA. L. REV. 300 (1925).
163. Carpenter v. Sibley, 94 P. 879, 879 (Cal. 1908).
164. Leong Yau v. Carden, 23 Haw. 362, 369 (1916).
165. Oregon Supreme Court decisions provide perhaps the best example of how unsettled
the question of absolute immunity for prosecutors was for more than fifty years after 1871.
In 1924, that court, sitting en banc, refused to grant a prosecutor absolute immunity, holding
that a prosecutor who with intention falsely accused someone of a crime could be held liable
in tort. Watts v. Gerking, 222 P. 318, 321 (Or. 1924) (en banc). Months later, on reargument, a divided court reversed itself, withdrew its earlier decision, and held that the
prosecutor was protected by absolute immunity for the exercise of his quasi-judicial position.
Watts v. Gerking, 228 P. 135, 141 (Or. 1924) (en banc).
166. See generally Yaselli v. Goff, 275 U.S. 503 (1927).
167. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 124 n.11 (1997) (noting that Imbler did not cite
pre-1871 cases and relied primarily on “policy considerations”).
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prosecutorial immunity purportedly rests on historical understandings, it is
insupportable.
III. THE PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY DOCTRINE CREATES CONFLICTS AND
CONFUSION THAT COULD BE ELIMINATED BY THE UNIFORM APPLICATION
OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
As members of the Supreme Court have recognized, the current doctrine
of prosecutorial immunity is difficult to apply. 168 Depending on the
function they are performing at the time of the alleged misconduct,
prosecutors are sometimes entitled to absolute immunity and sometimes
entitled to qualified immunity. 169 Absolute immunity protects prosecutors
acting as advocates even when they engaged in intentional and malicious
misconduct; 170 qualified immunity protects prosecutors engaged in nonadvocacy functions unless they violated clearly established law of which a
reasonable officer would have known. 171 Under the current doctrine,
drawing the line between conduct entitled to absolute immunity and
conduct entitled to qualified immunity is a complicated question that has
generated multiple conflicting decisions.172 The two most recent cases
where the Supreme Court has granted certiorari on this issue are excellent
examples of the problem: Pottawattamie County v. McGhee 173 and
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd. 174
A. Pottawattamie County v. McGhee
The Pottawattamie County case presented two interrelated issues: (1) is
fabrication of evidence by a prosecutor before probable cause is established
a due process violation; and (2) if so, which type of immunity—absolute or
qualified—attaches where the prosecutor subsequently uses that evidence at
trial? To understand these issues, some doctrinal background is helpful.
The Supreme Court has held that the potent doctrine of absolute
prosecutorial immunity is reserved for advocacy functions intimately
connected with the judicial phase of the criminal proceedings. 175 Since
qualified immunity is presumed to be sufficient to protect honest officials
from litigation and liability for honest mistakes in the conduct of their

168. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 286–91 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (arguing in dissent that the distinction between advocatory and
investigatory functions requires “difficult and subtle distinctions” and that “the rule the
Court adopts” in the majority opinion “created more problems than it has solved”); Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 n.33 (1976) (“Drawing a proper line between these functions
may present difficult questions . . . .”).
169. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268–70; Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430–31.
170. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 124; Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427.
171. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268.
172. Johns, supra note 10, at 89–106.
173. 130 S. Ct. 1047 (2010) (cert. granted; case settled and dismissed after oral
argument).
174. 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011).
175. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273; Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430.
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office, 176 prosecutors receive only qualified immunity for misconduct in
performing investigative and administrative functions. 177 Determining
whether a prosecutor’s misconduct is an act of investigation or advocacy is
one of the most vexing questions arising under the prosecutorial immunity
doctrine. 178
One clear distinction was established in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons. 179 In
Buckley, the prosecutor had conspired with police to fabricate evidence
during the preliminary investigation of a rape and murder case. The Court
concluded that before a prosecutor has probable cause to arrest a defendant,
“[a] prosecutor neither is, nor should consider himself to be, an
advocate.” 180 Thus, before probable cause is established, only qualified
immunity applies. But the Court declined to rule on whether the plaintiff’s
due process rights had been violated by the prosecutor’s coercion of and
payment for witness testimony because the claim was unclear and had not
been addressed by the lower court. 181 In Justice Scalia’s view, claims about
the fabrication of evidence were unlikely to support civil rights actions
since, as he stated, he was aware of “no authority for the proposition that
the mere preparation of false evidence, as opposed to its use in a fashion
that deprives someone of a fair trial or otherwise harms him, violates the
Constitution.” 182
Since Buckley, the lower courts have split on this issue. The Third and
Seventh Circuits have held that coercion violates only the witness’s rights,
not the criminal defendant’s rights.183 The Second Circuit has held that
prosecutorial misconduct in gathering evidence violates the defendant’s
rights. 184 In Justice Thomas’s view, the failure to find a constitutional
violation when prosecutors fabricate evidence “leaves victims of egregious
prosecutorial misconduct without a remedy.” 185 The lower courts have also
split on the issue of which immunity applies if the prosecutor subsequently
uses the tainted evidence in the criminal proceeding. The Third Circuit has
held that absolute immunity applies,186 but the Second and Ninth Circuits
apply qualified immunity. 187

176. See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 281 (Scalia, J., concurring); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478,
486–87 (1991); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 811 (1982).
177. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273 (majority opinion).
178. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33.
179. 509 U.S. 259 (1993).
180. Id. at 274.
181. Id. at 279.
182. Id. at 281 (Scalia, J., concurring).
183. Michaels v. New Jersey, 222 F.3d 118, 121 (3d Cir. 2000); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,
20 F.3d 789, 794 (7th Cir. 1994).
184. Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 349 (2d Cir. 2000).
185. Michaels v. McGrath, 531 U.S. 1118, 1119 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari).
186. Michaels v. McGrath, 222 F.3d 118, 123 (3d Cir. 2000).
187. Milstein v. Cooley, 257 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001); Zahrey, 221 F.3d at 347.
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These are precisely the questions presented by Pottawattamie County v.
McGhee. 188 If a prosecutor fabricates evidence or coerces testimony in the
early stages of a criminal investigation, is that a violation of the criminal
defendant’s due process rights? And if so, is the prosecutor entitled to only
qualified immunity because the misconduct occurred in the investigative
stage? Or if the prosecutor subsequently uses that evidence in the criminal
proceeding, is the prosecutor entitled to absolute immunity because
introducing evidence is advocacy that is intimately connected with the
judicial phase of the criminal trial?
The facts of the McGhee case are tragic. In 1978, Curtis W. McGhee and
Terry Harrington were convicted of murdering a retired police officer who
was working as a security guard. 189 The prosecutor obtained these
convictions by offering perjured testimony, fabricating evidence, and failing
to disclose compelling exculpatory evidence.190 McGhee and Harrington
were found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment.191 Their postconviction actions for relief were denied. 192 In 2002, their convictions were
finally overturned for prosecutorial misconduct by the Iowa Supreme
Court—after they had served twenty-four years of their life sentences.193
McGhee and Harrington then brought civil rights actions against the
county, as well as the prosecutors and investigators involved in the case. 194
They contended that the defendants violated their constitutional rights by
withholding exculpatory evidence and using perjured testimony and
Defendants moved for summary judgment,
fabricated evidence.195
claiming qualified and absolute immunity. 196 The prosecutors argued that
there was no constitutional violation in procuring or fabricating evidence
before the filing of the “True Information.” 197 In their view, it was only
using the evidence at trial that was unconstitutional and that they were
entitled to absolute immunity for this misconduct because it was
prosecutorial advocacy intimately connected to the judicial proceedings.198
The district court granted in part and denied in part these motions.199
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the
trial court’s ruling. 200 The court pointed out that it had previously held that
that “a person’s due process rights are violated when police officers use

188. 130 S. Ct. 1047 (2010) (cert. granted; case settled and dismissed after oral
argument).
189. McGhee v. Pottawattamie County, 547 F.3d 922, 925 (8th Cir. 2008).
190. Id. at 926–28.
191. Id. at 927.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 925.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 930–31.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 931.
200. Id. at 926.
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falsified evidence to procure a conviction.” 201 The court affirmed that
procuring or fabricating false evidence is a constitutional violation
regardless of whether it was done by police officers or by prosecutors. As
the court observed, “‘[I]t would be a perverse doctrine of tort and
constitutional law that would hold liable the fabricator of evidence who
hands it to an unsuspecting prosecutor but exonerate the wrongdoer who
enlists himself in a scheme to deprive a person of liberty.’” 202 And the
court held that where the prosecutor’s misconduct consisted of both
fabricating the evidence and then using the evidence at trial, immunity does
not shield the misconduct. Fabricating the evidence before the filing of
formal charges was not “a distinctly prosecutorial function” entitled to
either absolute or qualified immunity. 203
Undoubtedly, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict
in the lower courts on these questions. Specifically, in Pottawattamie
County, the Eighth Circuit acknowledged that its decision was consistent
with the view of the Second Circuit, 204 but in tension with that of the
Seventh Circuit. 205 This case was dismissed after full briefing and oral
argument, 206 so this conflict remains unresolved.
B. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd
Most recently, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and decided Ashcroft
v. al-Kidd. 207 The question presented was whether the U.S. Attorney
General was entitled to absolute or qualified immunity when he used a
material witness warrant with the intent to detain a person suspected of
terrorist activity for investigation. 208 While the al-Kidd case arose in the
context of a material witness warrant, it raised the broader question of the
relevance of the prosecutor’s subjective state of mind in applying the
prosecutorial immunity doctrine.
Since the case was an interlocutory appeal following the denial of a
motion to dismiss, the facts are taken from the plaintiff’s complaint.209
Plaintiff Abdullah al-Kidd was born in Kansas in 1972; his parents,

201. Id. at 932. The Supreme Court has previously recognized that where prosecutors
and police engage in the same act of misconduct, the law would protect the prosecutor, but
not the police officer. As the Court stated in Buckley, “[I]t is ‘neither appropriate nor
justifiable that, for the same act, immunity should protect the one and not the other.’”
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993) (quoting Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F.2d
602, 608 (7th Cir. 1973)).
202. McGhee, 547 F.3d at 932 (quoting McGhee v. Pottawattamie County, 475 F. Supp.
2d 862, 907 (S.D. Iowa 2007)).
203. Id. at 933.
204. Id. at 932–33; see Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342, 344, 349 (2d Cir. 2000).
205. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 1994).
206. Pottawattamie County v. McGhee, 130 S. Ct. 1047 (2010); see Boundaries of
Prosecutorial Immunity, supra note 3 (reporting that the case was settled for $12 million for
two wrongfully convicted men).
207. 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011).
208. Id. at 2079.
209. al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 952 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009).
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siblings, and two children are also native-born U.S. citizens. 210 While
attending college at the University of Idaho in the mid-1990s, the plaintiff
converted to Islam and changed his name from Lavoni T. Kidd to Abdullah
al-Kidd. 211 Following the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the federal
government began conducting surveillance of the plaintiff.212 The
surveillance logs found no illegal activity by the plaintiff and he has never
been charged with a crime. 213 In March 2003, the plaintiff planned to travel
to Saudi Arabia on a scholarship with an established university to further
his language and religious studies. 214 When he was at Dulles Airport in
Virginia, the FBI arrested al-Kidd pursuant to a material witness warrant
issued in Idaho in the case of Sami Al-Hassayen, who had been indicted for
visa fraud and making false statements to the government. 215 Al-Hassayen
was never convicted of those or other charges. 216
The affidavit submitted by FBI agents to obtain the plaintiff’s warrant
incorrectly stated that the plaintiff was taking a one-way, first-class flight to
Saudi Arabia for $5,000, when in fact he had a round-trip ticket costing
about $1,700. 217 Moreover, the FBI affidavits failed to disclose that the
plaintiff: had voluntarily talked to the FBI on previous occasions; had
native-born U.S. children; had not been contacted by the FBI for six months
before his arrest; had never been told by the FBI that he might be needed as
a witness, that he should not travel, or that he should inform the FBI if he
intended to travel; and had never been asked to surrender his passport or
postpone his trip. 218
After his arrest, al-Kidd was interrogated without counsel. 219 Following
the magistrate judge’s suggestion (without advice of counsel), the plaintiff
agreed to have his hearing in Idaho. 220 He spent the next fifteen nights in
jails in Virginia, Oklahoma, and Idaho, in high-security wings with
convicted criminals. 221 He was repeatedly strip-searched and routinely
shackled. 222 When he was finally released from detention, he was required
to live with his in-laws, report regularly to the government, and remain in a
limited geographic area.223 The government never called al-Kidd as a
witness in the criminal trial against Al-Hassayen, 224 which did not

210. Id. at 951–52; Brief for Respondent at 1, Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011)
(No. 10-98), 2011 WL 219561, at *1.
211. al-Kidd, 580 F.3d at 952; Brief for Respondent, supra note 210, at 1.
212. Brief for Respondent, supra note 210, at 1.
213. Id.
214. al-Kidd, 580 F.3d at 952; Brief for Respondent, supra note 210, at 2.
215. al-Kidd, 580 F.3d at 953; Brief for Respondent, supra note 210, at 2.
216. Brief for Respondent, supra note 210, at 2.
217. al-Kidd, 580 F.3d at 952–53; Brief for Respondent, supra note 210, at 2.
218. Brief for Respondent, supra note 210, at 3.
219. Id. at 4
220. Id. at 4–5.
221. al-Kidd, 580 F.3d at 953; Brief for Respondent, supra note 210, at 5.
222. Brief for Respondent, supra note 210, at 5.
223. al-Kidd, 580 F.3d at 953; Brief for Respondent, supra note 210, at 5.
224. al-Kidd, 580 F.3d at 954; Brief for Respondent, supra note 210, at 5.
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commence for more than a year after his arrest. 225 Even after the AlHassayen trial, the government maintained close supervision of the plaintiff
until he moved for relief. 226 Based on public statements by high ranking
federal officials—including FBI Director Robert Mueller and the head of
the Department of Justice’s Criminal Division, Michael Chertoff—al-Kidd
alleged that he was improperly arrested and detained without probable
cause for the purpose of investigating his possible criminal activities, not
for the purpose of securing testimony in the criminal trial of AlHassayen. 227
Ashcroft moved to dismiss al-Kidd’s complaint on the grounds of
absolute and qualified immunity. 228 In his view, the decision to submit a
material witness warrant is always a prosecutorial function.229 The district
court rejected the motion, finding that the use of the material witness
warrant to “detain individuals while investigating possible criminal activity
qualifies as a police type investigative activity, not prosecutorial
advocacy.” 230
The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling. 231
While
recognizing that absolute immunity may often attach to the government’s
decision to seek a material witness warrant, 232 it distinguished cases where
the decision to seek a material witness warrant was to further an
investigative—not prosecutorial—function. In such cases, only qualified
immunity applies. 233 In reaching this conclusion, the court candidly
considered the goal and intent of the prosecution in seeking the warrant.234
The court stressed that its conclusion did not rest on naked allegations of
motive but on plausible facts from the public record and other objective
indicia. 235 Former Attorney General Ashcroft petitioned for certiorari as to
whether the court of appeals erred by denying him absolute immunity on
the grounds that he was using the material witness warrant as a pretext to
investigate and preventively detain terrorism suspects.236
On May 31, 2011, the Court issued its decision in al-Kidd. 237 The Court
held that Ashcroft was entitled to qualified immunity because the material
witness warrant was valid under the Fourth Amendment’s objective
Since Ashcroft did not violate clearly
reasonableness standard. 238

225. Brief for Respondent, supra note 210, at 5.
226. Id.
227. al-Kidd, 580 F.3d at 954–55; Brief for Respondent, supra note 210, at 5–10.
228. al-Kidd, 580 F.3d at 957.
229. Id. at 959.
230. Id. at 956.
231. Id. at 981.
232. Id. at 959–60.
233. Id. at 960.
234. Id. at 960–62.
235. Id. at 962–63.
236. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at I, Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011) (No.
10-98), 2010 WL 2830439, at *I.
237. 131 S. Ct. 2074.
238. Id. at 2080.
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established law, he was immune from liability under § 1983.239 Justice
Scalia concluded, “[W]e need not address the more difficult question of
whether he enjoys absolute immunity.” 240
While the Court was able to dodge the absolute immunity question in
al-Kidd, that difficult question remains unresolved. Prior decisions have
held that distinguishing between an investigative and an advocacy function
often turns on the prosecutor’s purpose—that is, the prosecutor’s subjective
state of mind. 241 For this reason, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have held that
when a prosecutor interviews a witness after probable cause has been met,
the question of whether the prosecutor is acting as an investigator or an
advocate depends on the prosecutor’s purpose in conducting the
interview. 242 Under this approach, the court must examine the events
surrounding the conduct to determine the prosecutor’s intent.243
The need for extensive discovery to determine the prosecutor’s state of
mind is illustrated by a Ninth Circuit case, KRL v. Moore. 244 In KRL, the
plaintiff contended that after probable cause had been established, the
prosecutor secured a search warrant which went beyond the need for
preparation for the pending criminal case and sought to gather evidence of
additional criminal activity. 245 The court held that a genuine question of
fact was presented as to whether the prosecutor obtained the warrant to
collect evidence to prosecute the existing charges or for a collateral
investigation. 246 To determine the prosecutor’s motive, it was necessary to
reconstruct events through notes and testimony, which required significant
factual discovery. 247
But injecting a substantive state-of-mind analysis into the immunity
defense raises several problems. First, the Buckley Court warned against
allowing prosecutors to escape liability by simply claiming that
investigative functions were for advocacy purposes. 248 Second, in its
qualified immunity decisions, the Supreme Court has ruled that subjective
inquiries lead to wide-ranging discovery which can disrupt effective
government and prolong litigation, thus defeating the very purpose of the
immunity defenses, which is to eliminate not just liability, but also

239. Id. at 2085.
240. Id.
241. Genzler v. Longanbach, 410 F.3d 630, 638 (9th Cir. 2005); KRL v. Moore, 384 F.3d
1105, 1111 (9th Cir. 2004); Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 627, 633–35 (5th Cir. 2003); Broam
v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1030–31 (9th Cir. 2003).
242. Genzler, 410 F.3d at 638; KRL, 384 F.3d at 1111; Cousin, 325 F.3d at 633–35;
Broam, 320 F.3d at 1030–31.
243. Cousin, 325 F.3d at 629–35; Broam, 320 F.3d at 1033–34.
244. 384 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2004).
245. Id. at 1112.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 276 (1993).
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litigation. 249 For this reason, the Court emphatically replaced the subjective
standard with an objective standard in Harlow v. Fitzgerald.250
It is unlikely that the Court will resurrect a subjective standard in
absolute immunity cases. Allowing wide-ranging discovery into the
prosecutor’s subjective state of mind seems as undesirable in absolute
immunity cases as it was in qualified immunity cases before the Court
adopted the objective standard in Harlow. 251 But this is exactly what seems
to be required to determine whether a prosecutor was acting in an
investigative or advocacy capacity after probable cause is established.
The simplest solution is to apply qualified immunity in all cases:
regardless of whether the prosecutor was acting as an investigator or
advocate, did the prosecutor violate clearly established law of which a
reasonable prosecutor would have known? If not, qualified immunity
protects the prosecutor from liability. If so, the prosecutor should be held
liable for violating the accused’s well-established constitutional rights. The
current qualified immunity doctrine has evolved into a standard that “is
sufficient to ‘protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion
and the related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of
official authority.’” 252 Indeed, qualified immunity protects “‘all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’”253
As the Pottawattamie County and al-Kidd cases illustrate, numerous
conflicts in the application of the current prosecutorial immunity doctrine
are generated by the difficulty of determining whether absolute or qualified
immunity applies in a given case. But in both of these cases, the Court
never reached decisions on the absolute immunity questions, so the
uncertainties remain. Scrapping the doctrine of absolute immunity in favor
of the uniform application of qualified immunity would eliminate much of
the complexity and confusion. As I have previously argued, absolute
immunity undermines the integrity of the criminal justice process,254 denies
victims a remedy for constitutional wrongs, 255 and fails to deter
prosecutorial misconduct. 256 Absolute immunity is unnecessary to protect
honest prosecutors, who are protected by stiff requirements for pleading and
proving a constitutional violation and by the doctrine of qualified
immunity. 257 Rather, the uniform application of the doctrine of qualified
249. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815–18 (1982).
250. Id. at 815–19. Under the Harlow test, an officer is entitled to qualified immunity
unless the alleged misconduct violated clearly established law of which a reasonable officer
would have known. Id. at 818–19.
251. Id. at 815–19.
252. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 268 (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978)); see
Johns, supra note 10, at 136–39 (explaining that qualified immunity has evolved to a more
efficient and protective standard since absolute prosecutorial immunity was adopted in
1976).
253. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 495 (1991) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,
341 (1986)).
254. Johns, supra note 10, at 123–25.
255. Id. at 125–26.
256. Id. at 127–28.
257. Id. at 131–39.
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immunity would simplify an unnecessarily complex area of the law, serve
the criminal justice process, and protect the honest prosecutor while
providing a remedy for intentional and malicious prosecutorial misconduct.
CONCLUSION
The doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity in federal civil rights
actions is unsupportable. From the point of view of public policy, absolute
prosecutorial immunity leads to wrongful prosecutions and convictions,
ruins the lives of the wrongly accused, subjects crime victims to the painful
and protracted relitigation of their experiences, impairs public safety,
wastes public resources, and undermines public respect for, and confidence
in, the criminal justice system. Moreover, absolute prosecutorial immunity
is historically unjustified. Section 1983 was adopted to provide a federal
civil rights remedy against Southern prosecutors who were using criminal
prosecutions to deny newly freed slaves their civil rights, and to punish and
deter Union officers and officials from enforcing those civil rights. It was
not intended to shield prosecutors from liability; on the contrary, it was
intended to subject them to liability. And finally, the doctrine generates
conflicts and confusion that complicate and prolong civil rights actions for
prosecutorial misconduct.
In place of absolute immunity, qualified immunity should be uniformly
applied. Qualified immunity would protect honest prosecutors from
unwarranted litigation while affording victims of deliberate prosecutorial
misconduct a remedy for the willful violation of their civil rights. Qualified
immunity would be consistent with the common law as it existed in 1871
and with the purposes underlying the adoption of § 1983—providing a
federal civil rights remedy for malicious prosecutions. And the uniform
application of qualified immunity would simplify and streamline the law by
providing an objective standard that could be applied at the early stages of
litigation to protect prosecutors not only from liability, but also from the
burden of litigation.

